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Korea looms large in any evaluation of the career of Dean 
Acheson. President Harry Truman regarded the military intervention 
in response to the North Korean attack in 1950 as one of the major 
achievements of his administration - “Most important of all, we acted 
in Korea.”1) And he praised Acheson for his decisive role. In a 
personally written note to his Secretary of State, the President 
observed, “Your initiative in immediately calling the Security Council 
of the UN on Saturday night and notifying me was the key to what 
followed afterwards. Had you not acted promptly in that direction we 
would have had to go into Korea alone.”2) Acheson’s critics, on the 
1) Harry S. Truman, “Farewell Address to the American People,” January 15, 1953, 
accessed November 26, 2012, www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/indexphp?pid= 
14392&st=&st1=.
2) Yale University, Dean Acheson Papers, box 30, folder 390, Truman to Acheson, 
July 19, 1950.
90   Michael F. Hopkins
other hand, have suggested that Korea was an avoidable war. 
Republican politicians during the war and later scholars singled out 
Acheson’s speech of January 12, 1950, saying it encouraged the 
North Koreans and more particularly Josef Stalin to believe that an 
assault could be undertaken with little risk of an American reaction.3) 
In a speech to Congress on June 28, 1950, Senator Robert Taft said 
that the crisis was caused “first, by the outrageous, aggressive 
attitude of Soviet Russia, and second, by the bungling and 
inconsistent foreign policy of the administration.” He then called on 
Acheson to resign, since his “policies precipitated the dangers of 
war.”4) Bruce Cumings goes further, accusing Acheson not of 
incompetence but of cynical calculation: he deliberately provoked the 
North and the Soviet Union into an attack, which would then allow 
Washington to develop its grander global strategy.5)
These two schools of criticism - the bungler or the cunning 
conniver - turn on their examination of the six or seven months 
before the June attack. Acheson’s admirers also concentrate on this 
period.6) However, any effective evaluation of such verdicts requires 
3) See, for example, John Lewis Gaddis, We Now Know (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1997), 72-75.
4) Taft speech, June 28, 1950, in Barton J. Bernstein and Alan J. Matusov, The 
Truman Administration: A Documentary History (New York: Harper & Row, 
1966), 439-442; Congressional Record, 81st Congress, Senate, 2nd Session, 1950, 
pp. 9319-9323.
5) Bruce Cumings developed, and refined, his argument in a series of publications: 
“Introduction: The Course of Korean-American Relations, 1943-1953,” in Child 
of Conflict: The Korean-American Relationship, 1943-1953 ed. Bruce Cumings 
(Seattle, Washington: University of Washington Press, 1983), 3-55; The Origins 
of the Korean War. Volume 2: The Roaring of the Cataract, 1947-1950 
(Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press), 408-438; and The Korean 
War (New York: Modern Library, 2010), 72-73.
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a thorough understanding of his interest in, and influence on, 
American policy to Korea from the end of the Second World and the 
beginning of Washington’s direct engagement with the country to the 
assault of June 1950. For most of that period Acheson held senior 
positions in the US government. He served first as Under Secretary 
of State from August 1945 to June 1947; and then as Secretary of 
State from January 1949 to June 1950. Although a number of books 
have examined American policy between 1945 and 1950,7) it is 
surprising how little has been written about Acheson and Korea. 
Ronald McGlothlen is the only scholar to have subjected his 
activities in this period to detailed scrutiny, and even he gives scant 
attention to 1945-1946.8) This article aims to correct this omission 
and present a fuller appreciation of Acheson’s role in American 
policy to Korea.
6) See, for example, Gaddis Smith, Dean Acheson (New York: Cooper Square, 
1972) and David McLellan, Dean Acheson (New York: Dodd, Mead & Co., 
1976).
7) Charles M. Dobbs, The Unwanted Symbol: American Foreign Policy, the Cold 
War, and Korea, 1945-1950 (Kent, Ohio: Kent State University Press, 1981); 
William Stueck, The Road to Confrontation: American Policy Toward China and 
Korea, 1947-1950 (Chapel Hill, North Carolina: University of North Carolina 
Press, 1981); and James I. Matray, The Reluctant Crusade: American Foreign 
Policy in Korea, 1941-1950 (Honolulu, Hawaii: University of Hawaii Press, 
1985).
8) Ronald McGlothlen, “Acheson, Economics, and the American Commitment in 
Korea, 1947-1950,” Pacific Historical Review, 58.1 (1989): 23-54; Ronald 
McGlothlen, Controlling the Waves: Dean Acheson and US Policy in Asia (New 
York: W.W. Norton, 1993).
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Under Secretary of State Dean Acheson and Korea, 
August 1945-June 1947
Dean Acheson served as Under Secretary to James F. Byrnes from 
August 1945 to January 1947, and then to George C. Marshall for 
the first six months of 1947. Byrnes was away from Washington for 
a substantial part of his term: he was abroad for 62 per cent of his 
time. Marshall was also regularly overseas, being absent for 47 per 
cent of his period in office.9) This meant that Acheson frequently 
served as Acting Secretary. He was able to discharge these 
responsibilities in an effective manner because he soon developed 
very good relations with the President, who was willing to allow the 
State Department a leading role in framing policy, so long as he was 
properly consulted. Acheson and Truman shared the same strategic 
vision of America’s role in the world. But on Korea (until June 
1950) Acheson was more engaged than the President. Truman said 
and did little on the peninsula until encouraged by Acheson in 
spring-summer 1947 and again in 1949 and 1950.10)
Korea had been part of the Japanese empire since the victory over 
Russia in 1905 and was formally annexed in 1910. During the 
Second World War the Roosevelt administration looked sympathetically 
toward its people. Officials noted how Koreans had resisted Japanese 
9) James F. Byrnes, Speaking Frankly (New York: Harper, 1947), 245; Henry 
Wriston, “The Secretary of State Abroad,” Foreign Affairs, 34:4 July 1956, 523.
10) According to McGlothlen, “Acheson, Economics, and the American Commitment 
in Korea,” 32, Truman, when asked about Korea in press conferences, either 
denied knowledge of details or declined comment. See Public Papers of the 
Presidents of the United States: Harry S. Truman (Washington DC: USGPO, 
1963), 191, 240, 247, and 282.
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pressure to join their armed forces, and decided, therefore, that they 
would not treat Koreans in the United States and Hawaii as enemy 
aliens.11) A number of decisions in 1945 determined American 
involvement with postwar Korea. In the first place, President 
Roosevelt had suggested that Britain, China, the United States and 
the Soviet Union should form a four-power trusteeship of Korea, 
which was finally endorsed by Stalin in a meeting with the 
President’s special envoy, Harry Hopkins. Roosevelt thereby ensured 
that the trusteeship was a working assumption in discussion at the 
Potsdam conference of July-August.12) During the conference the 
Soviets also confirmed that they would enter the conflict in Asia, 
declaring war against Japan on 8 August. The dropping of atomic 
bombs on 6 and 9 August brought Japan to the brink of surrender 
and gave rise to the second issue for decision - where Washington 
and Moscow would place their forces in Korea. James Dunn of the 
State Department asked General Lincoln of the Army Operations 
Division for advice on the deployment of US forces into Korea. 
Lincoln consulted Colonel C. H. Bonesteel and Colonel Dean Rusk, 
who examined a National Geographic map, “Asia and Adjacent 
Areas.” The three men agreed that the 38th parallel should form the 
dividing line between the occupying forces, with Soviet troops north 
11) NARA, Record Group 131, Records of Office of Alien Property, Foreign Funds 
Control Committee Files, General Correspondence, 1942-1960, box 237, Japan: 
Chosen folder, White to Kahn, January 29, 1942.
12) Foreign Relations of the United States [hereafter FRUS]: Conference at Berlin 
(Potsdam) I, 14 (Memorandum of Conversation by Grew, May 15, 1945), 47 
Memorandum of 3rd Conversation at Kremlin, May 28, 1945, 6pm), 234 
(Harriman to Truman and Byrnes, July 9 [8], 1945), 309-310 (Memorandum by 
Elsey, nd but submitted July 1, 1945), 310-315 (Briefing Book Papers).
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of that line and American ones to its south. On August 16 Stalin 
agreed to the proposal. The line was the same as that suggested as a 
division between Japan and Russia in 1896.13)
Soviet forces entered Korea on August 10, while an American 
advance party arrived on September 4 and the main force came on 
September 9. General John Hodge led the American Military 
Government with a force of 45,000 troops. He confronted difficult 
circumstances. James Schnabel suggests that the “Korean economy 
was in a perilous state” and the “political atmosphere was turbulent 
and tense.”14) If Korean patriots conceded the temporary need for the 
presence of foreign forces, they bitterly resented the scheme for a 
great powers’ trusteeship. They welcomed the commitment to Korean 
independence at the Cairo conference in 1943, but resented its 
qualification “in due course.”15) Hodge faced frequent disturbances 
and violence and tried to find a means of involving Koreans. In the 
judgment of Arnold Offner, however, Hodge was a hard-nosed 
conservative who worked with the most conservative Korean 
politicians, such as Kim Ku, President of the Korean Provisional 
13) FRUS 1945 VI, 1039; Stalin’s Correspondence with Churchill, Attlee, Roosevelt 
and Truman, 1941-1945 (London: Lawrence & Wishart, 1958), 261-266. See 
also Bruce Cummings, The Origins of the Korean War: Liberation and the 
Emergence of Separate States (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University 
Press, 1981), 120-122; William Stueck, Rethinking the Korean War (Princeton, 
New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 2002), 11-12; and James F. Schnabel, 
The United States Army in the Korean War. Policy and Direction: The First 
Year (Washington DC: USGPO, 1972), 8-11.
14) Schnabel, US Army in Korean War. The First Year, 18.
15) FRUS: Cairo and Tehran Conferences 1943, 448-449, Final Communiqué, 
November 22, 1943. Stalin agreed to the Cairo declaration at the Tehran 
conference; see FRUS Cairo and Tehran Conferences 1943, 566, 
Roosevelt-Churchill-Stalin luncheon meeting, November 30, 1943, 1:30pm.
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Government in Chungking (Chongqing), and its representative, 
Syngman Rhee, who called himself Chairman of the Korean 
Commission in the United States.16) Meanwhile, Moscow encouraged 
like-minded politicians in its zone. On February 8, 1946, the Soviets 
created in their occupation zone the North Korean Interim People’s 
Committee, headed by Kim Il Sung. In the course of 1946 and 1947 
the Soviets worked with Kim to suppress alternative political voices 
in their zone. According to Offner, the Americans had a twin-track 
approach of Hodge seeking to establish a bulwark against communism 
while Byrnes sought international cooperation through the trusteeship. 
The Soviets, he maintains, were ready to see an independent Korea, 
so long as it was neutral or friendly.17) This seems a rather generous 
view of the Soviet position.
Acheson displayed no distinctive outlook on Korea in the first 
months after the war’s end. He shared the consensus view of the 
State Department’s Asian experts led by John Carter Vincent, 
Director of the Office of Far Eastern Affairs, who argued in favor of 
cooperation with the Soviet Union. Vincent urged Hodge not to favor 
any particular Koreans because such support “might greatly 
complicate the political problems facing the military government, as 
well as encourage the Soviet commander to sponsor a similar group 
in his zone and thus postpone establishment of a unified Korea.” It 
would appear that Vincent was unaware that the Soviets were already 
making just such arrangements in their zone. John J. McCoy, 
16) Arnold Offner, Another Such Victory: Harry Truman and the Cold War 
(Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 2002), 351.
17) Ibid., 351-353.
96   Michael F. Hopkins
Assistant Secretary of War, argued that Vincent was ignoring “the 
pressing realities facing us in Korea,” namely, Hodge’s concern that 
the “communists will seize by direct means the government in our 
area,” Soviet refusal to cooperate with the United States, and 
SHOULD READ thecommunists’ growing domination of the North. 
Vincent, however, secured Secretary of State Byrnes’s endorsement of 
the policy of cooperation with Moscow: “it would be safer... to 
negotiate with the USSR before attempting to introduce a new idea 
such as a governing commission.”18) Alan Millett accurately 
summarises Acheson’s belief in this period that “postcolonial nations” 
like Korea “should pass through some period of education on 
Western political values and practices and economic development 
before receiving international recognition as sovereign states.”19)
The third decision of the year on Korea came at the December 
1945 Council of Foreign Ministers in Moscow. Secretary of State 
Byrnes signed what was soon known as the Moscow Agreement, 
which spoke of tutelage and trusteeship and a joint commission to 
create a provisional government. Hodge quickly recognized its 
unpopularity among Koreans, so he tried to downplay the references 
to trusteeship. Vincent and others in the State Department criticized 
Hodge for undermining the Moscow Agreement. However, Acheson, 
according to Millett, “immediately distanced himself from John Carter 
18) FRUS 1945 Ⅵ, 1114 [1113-1114], (Vincent to Vittrup, War Department, 
November 7, 1945), 1122-1124, (McCoy to Acheson, November 13, 1945), 
1127-1128 (Vincent to Acheson, November 16, 1945), 1137-1138 (Byrnes to 
Langdon, November 29, 1945); see also Dobbs, The Unwanted Symbol, 53-54.
19) Allan R. Millett, The War for Korea, 1945-1950: A House Burning (Lawrence, 
Kansas: University Press of Kansas, 2005), 67.
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Vincent and the Asian specialists,” when Truman “openly questioned 
Byrnes’s judgment.”20)
The US-Soviet joint commission began its work in March but soon 
ran into difficulties, when the Soviets said they would only speak to 
“democratic” Korean politicians, saying that neither Rhee nor Ku 
qualified. So the commission adjourned sine die on May 16. Offner 
argues that the Americans then pursued a separate government for 
their zone. But it is not clear that they had reached such a definite 
conclusion by mid-1946.21) During that summer Edwin Pauley, the 
president’s special representative on reparations, went on a tour of 
the Far East, including Korea, to explore what would be done about 
Japanese reparations. In a letter on 22 June 1946 Pauley told Truman 
that he was “greatly concerned” about Soviet behavior in Korea, 
which hindered the achievement of the American goal of a 
democratic and independent Korea. He regarded this as “an 
ideological background on which our entire success in Asia may 
depend.” In his reply of July 16, Truman agreed. The President’s 
response was based on a draft of July 6 by John Carter Vincent, 
which he sent to Acheson, who approved it and passed it to the 
President. It is easy to conclude that this was a harbinger of conflict 
with Moscow. The President, however, was more measured than 
Pauley, saying that he favored continued efforts to persuade the 
Soviets to comply with the Moscow agreement, while increasing 
informational educational efforts to build up a self-governing and 
20) Ibid., 71; Millett offers no documentary support for this claim.
21) FRUS 1946 Ⅷ, 681-682, Memorandum on meeting of Secretaries of State, War 
and Navy, May 22, 1946. See also, Offner, Another Such Victory, 351-353.
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democratic Korea.22)
Acheson continued to support efforts to negotiate with Moscow and 
issued public statements saying this in August and October. He said 
that the United States wanted to see “a united, independent, and 
democratic Korean government established as early as possible.” 
Americans wished to carry out the Moscow declaration, including the 
endeavors of the joint commission. He stressed the need to pursue 
efforts to solve social and economic problems in the country. He also 
emphasized that the United States intended staying in order to carry 
out its duties.23)
George C. Marshall became Secretary of State in January 1947. 
Korea was a pressing issue but he was preoccupied with the next 
meeting of the Council of Foreign Ministers, scheduled to take place 
in Moscow in March-April. So he delegated a leading role on Korea 
to Acheson. Policy on Korea had to be framed in the face of two 
conflicting pressures. On the one hand, the War Department faced 
22) Announcement of Pauley mission, Department of State Bulletin 14.358 (May 12, 
1946): 821; FRUS 1946 Ⅷ, 504-505, Acting Secretary to Ambassador in Soviet 
Union (Smith), April 26, 1946; FRUS 1946 Ⅷ, 706-709, Pauley to Truman, 
June 22, 1946, 713-714, Truman to Pauley, July 16, 1946. Acheson and Truman 
were also cautious about how Pauley presented his findings. They did not want 
him to comment before they had reached agreement in the Far Eastern 
Commission, a body of eleven countries set up in December 1945 with the task 
of overseeing Japan’s fulfilment of its surrender terms. Pauley acceded to 
Acheson’s request that they only issue an anodyne statement. See FRUS 1946 
Ⅷ, 592, Pauley to Secretary of State, November 12, 1946, 592-593, Acting 
Secretary to Pauley,November 15, 1946; press release, November 17, 
Department of State Bulletin 15.386 (November, 24, 1946): 957-959.
23) Dean Acheson, “US Objectives in Policy Toward Korea,” Department of State 
Bulletin 15.375 (September 8, 1946), 462; Dean Acheson, “US Policy in 
Korea,” Department of State Bulletin 15.380 (October 13, 1946), 670. 
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budget cuts and concluded that withdrawal from Korea would be a 
good way of trimming expenditure. On the other hand, the State 
Department, and Acheson in particular, argued for the importance of 
Korea, especially its value as a source of food and as a market for 
Japanese exports. In February came the report by Raymond Harrison’s 
special committee on food, which shared Acheson’s outlook that Korea 
was an important source of food for Japan.24) The State-War-Navy 
Coordinating Committee (SWNCC), which addressed issues that 
crossed traditional departmental boundaries, set up an inter- 
departmental committee to examine Korea and concluded that 
withdrawal would mean “complete defeat” by the Russians. It 
supported Acheson’s proposal that there should be a three-year 
program of aid totalling $600m. Under this scheme there would be 
$250m for fiscal year 1948, rather than $137m the War Department 
was proposing.25)
The debate on Korea coincided with a major re-evaluation of 
American foreign policy. The first initiative in this process owed a 
good deal to the advice of Acheson. Since the end of the Second 
World War in 1945 Britain had aided Greece’s monarchists in their 
civil war with the communists; and it had assisted Turkey in its 
efforts to resist Soviet pressure to open the Straits to Soviet ships 
and to grant Moscow rights to establish military bases on Turkey’s 
Black Sea coast. In spring 1947 the British needed to make major 
24) NARA, RG59, Records of State Department, Central Decimal Files, 1945-1949, 
894.5018/4-2447 CS/JEC, box7364, Acheson to Harrison, nd but May 1947, 
Harrison, “Supply of Food for Civilian Relief in Japan,” February 19, 1947.
25) FRUS 1947 Ⅵ, 608-616, Memorandum by the Special Inter-Departmental 
Committee on Korea, February 25, 1947.
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cuts in expenditure and told the Americans that this would mean an 
end to funds for Greece and Turkey. Acheson took the lead in 
persuading first Marshall and Truman and then leading figures in 
Congress that the United States should take over the British role. So, 
in a speech to a joint session of Congress on March 12, Truman 
announced his intention to assist countries facing external or internal 
threats to their integrity; and secured Congressional approval for 
$400m aid to Greece and Turkey.26)
Syngman Rhee was keen to utilise Truman’s speech for his own 
purposes. On March 13 he sent a message of congratulations to the 
President and asked him to “instruct the American military authorities 
in Korea to follow your policy and abandon their efforts to bring 
about coalition between nationalists and communists.” He advised the 
immediate creation of an interim independent government in the US 
zone, which would act as a “bulwark against advancing communism 
and bring unification of north and south.” On March 21 Acheson 
responded by sending a message to Hodge’s political adviser, William 
R. Langdon, drawing his attention to comments in a press conference. 
The department’s press officer described the ideas in the letter as 
“Rhee’s suppositions.” He then explained that the administration was 
committed to strengthening the Korean economy and to bringing 
more Koreans into position of administrative responsibility in 
preparation for the American commitment to help Korea become a 
united self-governing independent nation. He added that the Americans 
26) Harry S. Truman, Speech to Joint Session of Congress, March 12, 1947, 
accessed November 26, 2012, www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=12846 
&st=&st1=. 
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were still committed to negotiations with the Soviet Union on 
unification of Korea under the terms of the Moscow Agreement. In 
answer to a reporter’s question, the press officer said that the United 
States had not given up hope in these talks.27)
For all its wide-ranging language, Truman and Acheson never 
intended applying what became known as the Truman Doctrine to 
many countries. But he told the Senate Foreign Relations Committee 
on March 13: “If there are situations where we can do something 
effective, then I think we must certainly do it.” Senator Smith asked 
him to comment on a newspaper editorial by Walter Lippmann, who 
said that the United States should limit its commitments to certain 
strategic areas. Acheson replied by accepting that there were places, 
such as Poland, Rumania and Bulgaria, where America had no 
access; so it “would be silly to believe we could do anything 
effective” in such locations. However, he continued: “There are other 
places where we can be effective. One of them is Korea, and I think 
that is another place where the line is clearly drawn between the 
Russians and ourselves.”28) 
Spring and early summer 1947 also saw growing anxieties in 
Washington about the economic problems in the world. Although 
most accounts of this period focus on Europe’s difficulties, Acheson 
and other officials were also disturbed by difficulties in Asia. On 
May 8, 1947, Acheson delivered a speech in Cleveland, Ohio that 
prefigured the Marshall Plan scheme for reconstructing the European 
27) FRUS 1947 VI, 620, Rhee to Truman, March 13, 1947, 620-621, Acheson to 
Langdon, March 21, 1947.
28) Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Historical Series, Legislative Origins of 
the Truman Doctrine (New York: Garland Publishing, 1979), 17, 21-22.
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economy. He spoke of the need to rebuild both Germany and Japa
n.29) Japan’s economy was vital to the whole of East Asia and it 
was in trouble - its exports in 1947 were only one-tenth of the 1934 
level. Together with Defense Secretary James Forrestal and supported 
by George Kennan, head of the Policy Planning Staff in the State 
Department, Acheson argued for abandonment of the tough policies 
of General Douglas MacArthur, who led the US occupation regime as 
Supreme Commander American Forces, Pacific (SCAP). These 
policies included purging business executives linked with military 
aggression and dismantling some of Japan’s manufacturing capacity. 
Acheson feared that the Japanese economy might collapse if the 
United States did not do more to promote the country’s economic 
growth. Although Acheson did not succeed in changing the American 
strategy in Japan while he was still in office, he had contributed 
significantly to the pressure for a shift in policy. As a result, in 
January 1948 SWNCC recommended a new approach, which was 
immediately adopted as policy by the Truman administration and 
communicated to the Far Eastern Commission. The American 
statement was released to the press and sent to MacArthur. Industrial 
growth and foreign trade would be encouraged so that Japan could 
make its “proper contribution to the economic rehabilitation of the 
world economy.” The Japanese government, under the supervision of 
SCAP, should act “energetically and effectively” to make Japan 
“economically self-supporting at the earliest possible time.”30)
29) Dean Acheson, “The Requirements of Reconstruction,” Department of State 
Bulletin 16.411 (May 18, 1947): 991-994.
30) Michael Schaller, The American Occupation of Japan (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1985), 72-120; FRUS 1948 VI, 654-656, Statement to Far 
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It was in this context that Acheson sought to persuade Congress to 
pass a Korea aid bill. He recognised that there might be financial 
concerns about aiding Korea, coming after $400m for Greece and 
Turkey and with the prospect of further funds for Europe. So he 
reduced the three-year figure for Korea to $540m and the amount for 
1948 to SHOULD READ $215m£215m.31) The military also 
questioned the strategic value of assistance for Korea. War Secretary 
Robert Patterson declared himself “convinced that the United States 
should pursue forcefully a course of action whereby we get out of 
Korea at an early date.” He complained that U.S. occupation forces 
in Korea were a “drain upon Army resources.” TWO QUOTATIONS, 
TWO CITATIONS; WOULD YOU PREFER TWO FOOTNOTES?32) 
Recognizing the growing resistance, Acheson approached Senator 
Arthur H. Vandenberg, chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations 
Committee, to try and find a way of getting the measure through 
Congress. Vandenberg strongly discouraged him from bringing another 
bill to authorize further foreign expenditure in the present session.33)
When Acheson left the State Department at the end of June 1947 
the Korea aid bill was withdrawn. He was out of office until January 
1949 and in the interval policy on Korea shifted to withdrawal of 
forces and more limited aid. In his absence the military arguments 
proved persuasive. The Joint Chiefs of Staff argued that “from the 
Eastern Commission, January 21, 1948.
31) FRUS 1947 VI, 621-623, Acheson to Patterson, March 28, 1947.
32) FRUS 1947 VI, 625-628, Patterson to Acheson, April 4, 1947; Walter Millis, 
ed., The Forrestal Diaries (New York: Viking Press, 1951), 265.
33) NARA, RG59, State Department, Central Decimal Files, 1945-1949, 790.0119 
Control Korea/6-2747, box 3818, Dean Acheson to Marshall and General 
Hilldring, June 27, 1947.
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standpoint of military security, the United States has little strategic 
interest in maintaining the present troops and bases in Korea.”34) By 
February 1948 the Joint Chiefs of Staff declared that “eventual 
domination of Korea by the USSR will have to be accepted as a 
probability if US troops are withdrawn.”35) The State Department’s 
main advocate of aid to Korea was a more junior figure, W. Walton 
Butterworth, who had succeeded John Carter Vincent as Director of 
the Office of Far Eastern Affairs in 1947, and who declared that the 
United States was morally committed to do something to prevent the 
economic collapse of the south.36) By September the tide had turned 
against Butterworth: the majority of officials felt the United States 
should disengage from South Korea.37) Even George Kennan shared 
this view. On September 24 he told Butterworth that American policy 
should be “to cut our losses and get out of there as gracefully as we 
can.”38) Five days later, after consulting Secretary of State Marshall, 
he said that the American goal should be “to get the best bargain we 
can regarding Korea.”39) The Policy Planning Staff then reported: 
“Since the territory is not of decisive strategic importance to us, our 
main task is to extricate ourselves without too great a loss of 
prestige.”40) On April 8 Truman approved NSC 8, which proposed 
34) FRUS 1947 VI, 817, Secretary of Defense Forrestal to Marshall, September 26 
[29], 1947.
35) Quoted in Robert Ferrell, Truman (Columbia, Missouri: University of Missouri 
Press, 1994), 318.
36) FRUS 1948 VI, 1137-1139, Butterworth to Marshall, March 4, 1948.
37) FRUS 1947 VI, 784-785, Stevens (Assistant Chief of the Division of Far 
Eastern Affairs) Memorandum, September 9, 1947.
38) FRUS 1947 VI, 814, Kennan to Butterworth, September 24, 1947.
39) FRUS 1947 VI, 818 note.
40) FRUS 1947 I, 776 [770-777], Report by Policy Planning Staff, Resume of 
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US military withdrawal and sufficient American military assistance to 
tackle internal threats.41)
Marshall also sought to revive the discussion of the US-Soviet 
joint commission on Korea. It met from May to August 1947 but 
again faced deadlock over Soviet refusal to talk to people who were 
not “democrats.” In consequence, there was inexorable movement 
toward separate Korean states. In November 1947 the UN General 
Assembly passed a resolution to establish the United Nations 
Temporary Commission on Korea (UNTCOK) to supervise elections 
by March 31, 1948. The Soviets denied UNTCOK access to the 
north. So, in February 1948 the UN General Assembly approved 
elections in South Korea. Financial aid totalling $113m, administered 
through the Marshall Plan, was approved for Korea.42) In May Rhee 
won an election victory in the south; the new Republic of Korea was 
recognised by the UN in December 1948 and the temporary 
commission (UNTCOK) became a full commission (UNCOK). In 
September 1948 the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea was 
created in the north and recognised by the Soviet Union in October.
Secretary of State Acheson and Korea, January 
1949-June 1950
When Acheson became Secretary of State in January 1949, he 
World Situation, PPS/13, November 6, 1947.
41) FRUS 1948 VI, 1164-1169, Report by the National Security on the Position of 
the United States with Respect to Korea, NSC 8, April 2, 1948.
42) FRUS 1948, VI, Truman to Marshall, August 25, 1948; McGlothlen, “Acheson, 
Economics, and the American Commitment in Korea,” 36.
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inherited a policy of military withdrawal. But he immediately 
encouraged voices in the department favoring greater engagement 
with Korea. A State Department policy statement prepared before his 
arrival but issued days after he assumed office highlighted the 
“political and psychological repercussions throughout the Far East, as 
well as the strategic implications of a withdrawal which might lead 
directly or indirectly to Soviet domination of the entire Korean 
peninsula.”43) Acheson also oversaw the reconsideration of NSC 8, 
which Butterworth had persuaded Marshall to authorize as one of his 
last acts before resigning. In the revised document, NSC 8/2, the 
military withdrawal would still proceed. By June 30, 1949, American 
troops left South Korea, leaving an advisory group of about 500. But 
it also contained, thanks to Acheson, a commitment to continued 
political support and economic, technical, military and other assistance 
for South Korea.44)
Acheson took the lead in securing legislation for this assistance. 
He obtained the backing of the President to endorse his proposal and 
began a campaign to win the approval of Congress. Under Secretary 
James Webb spoke to the House Foreign Affairs Committee, but he 
faced heavy criticism from Republicans. They attacked the 
administration’s Asian policy, and in particular its “inaction” in 
China: they charged Truman and Acheson with a failure to give 
43) RG59, State Department, Central Decimal Files, 1945-1949, 711.95/1-3149, box 
3441, Policy Statement, “Korea,” January 31, 1949.
44) FRUS 1948 Ⅵ, 1337-1340, Memorandum by Butterworth, December 17, 1948; 
FRUS 1949 Ⅶ Part 2, 969-978, Report by the National Security Council to the 
President, Position of the United States with Respect to Korea, NSC 8/2, March 
22, 1949.
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sufficient help to Chiang Kai-shek’s Nationalists in their fight with 
Mao Zedong’s communists. They called the Korea aid program “too 
little and too late.” But Acheson’s testimony managed to gain the 
backing of the committee, when he warned that immobility would 
send “shivers of fear” around East Asia and after he said that to 
walk away “without giving these fellows who have trusted in us any 
possible chance to survive” was not a very American thing to do.45) 
A bill was sent to Congress on July 25 asking for $1.4bn in military 
aid, which would include $150m of it going to South Korea. By 
August 5 the Senate had a new bill. Senator Vandenberg claimed 
that the administration had been compelled to surrender 80 per cent 
of its original proposal. In fact, the new bill only approved about 
$90 less than the original legislation. Aid would be disbursed to 
three different groups: the North Atlantic treaty countries; Greece and 
Turkey; and Iran, Korea and the Philippines.46) Although progress 
was still slow, Acheson and the department were not too dismayed 
because Congress passed deficiency appropriations of approximately 
$30m approval every three months, and was thus providing $120m a 
year to Korea.
The prospects for passage of the bill became much bleaker when 
the communists defeated the Nationalists and took power in China in 
October. This policy failure gave the Republicans a powerful means 
45) William S. White, “Korea Aid Program Draws GOP Attack,” New York Times, 
June 9, 1949; “$150,000,00 Aid to South Korea Gets Backing of House 
Committee,” New York Times, June 25, 1949; William S. White, “Vote Aid or 
Korea Will Fall in Three Months, Acheson Says,” New York Times, July 2, 
1949.
46) Dean Acheson, Present at the Creation (New York: W. W. Norton, 1969), 
309-310.
108   Michael F. Hopkins
of criticizing Truman, saying the administration had neglected Asia. 
A so-called China lobby, comprised mainly of Republicans in 
Congress and their sympathisers in business and the media, emerged 
to attack the President and the Secretary for “losing” China and to 
insist that the administration should do much more to help the 
Nationalists who had retreated to the large offshore island of Taiwan.
As the new Congress convened and reconsidered the Korean aid 
bill in January 1950, Acheson delivered a major speech to the 
National Press Club about American policy in Asia. He did so partly 
in response to the rising tension with the new communist government 
in Beijing. US diplomats had been expelled from their premises in 
the Chinese capital. There were fears of action by the Chinese 
communists against Taiwan. He sought to balance his and the 
President’s desire to demonstrate American firmness in the face of 
Chinese action and the need not to say or do anything that might 
escalate tensions. And he had to do this in an atmosphere of 
growing pressure from the China lobby. In defining US strategic 
commitments in the region, the Secretary excluded Korea from the 
area within the American defensive perimeter. He was only 
enunciating official policy. General Douglas MacArthur first 
delineated this concept in 1948, before expressing it to a journalist in 
March 1949. He said the American defense line ran “from the 
Philippines and continues through the Ryukyu Archipelago... Then it 
bends back through Japan and the Aleutian Island chain to Alaska.” 
This outlook was endorsed in December 1948 in NSC 41/1 and NSC 
48/2. A policy paper of November 14, 1949, declared that the United 
States would deal with any aggression against Asian states through 
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the United Nations, except where there was an American occupation.47)
In the immediate aftermath of the speech, no commentator or 
politician criticized Acheson’s outlook, not even Republican Senator 
Robert Taft, who only described the speech as an “invitation to 
attack,” after North Korea’s invasion in June.48) When the British 
Ambassador, Sir Oliver Franks, reported on the speech to London a 
few days afterwards, he did not even mention the exclusion of Korea 
from the American defensive perimeter, focusing instead on 
Acheson’s attempt to distance the administration from the Chinese 
Nationalists.49)
Various writers, however, are more critical. Bruce Cumings 
emerges in a number of studies as a leading sceptic. In his most 
recent book he declares that Acheson secretly committed the United 
States to Korea; after all, the early drafts of his speech included the 
country within the defensive perimeter. But he was obliged to be 
ambiguous, lest he encourage Rhee to action. Moreover, because the 
official text was unavailable for weeks, Cumings argues that the 
North Koreans and even the New York Times thought that Korea had 
47) Dean Acheson, “Crisis in Asia - An Examination of U.S. Policy,” Department 
of State Bulletin 22.551 (23 January 1950): 111-118; Acheson, Present at the 
Creation, 410; “M’Arthur Pledges Defense of Japan,” New York Times, March 
2, 1949, p. 22; Thomas H. Etzold and John Lewis Gaddis, Containment: 
Documents on American Foreign Policy and Strategy, 1945-1950 (New York: 
Columbia University Press, 1978), 252-276; FRUS 1949 Ⅶ Part 2, 1212, 
Outline of Far Eastern Asian Policy for Review with the President, November 
14, 1949.
48) Taft speech, June 28, 1950, in Bernstein and Matusov, Truman Administration: 
A Documentary History, 439-442.
49) The National Archives, Kew, London, FO 371/ 83013, F1022/5, Franks to 
Bevin, Despatch No. 37, January 16, 1950.
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been included within the defensive perimeter.50) The text appeared in 
the Department of State Bulletin on January 23, eleven days later. 
The speech was reported in the New York Times on January 13 and 
focused on Acheson’s remarks about China. It reported Acheson as 
saying that, contrary to the claims of Republicans, the Nationalists 
had not lost because of inadequate US military assistance but because 
“its forces melted away”; its government was not overthrown because 
“there was nothing to overthrow.” The newspaper accurately reported 
Acheson’s key points about US strategy in the region. It did not 
report the omission of Korea from the defensive perimeter. Rather, it 
recorded Acheson as saying that the defensive perimeter that ran 
from Ryukyu Islands and Aleutians off Alaska to Philippines 
continued to be upheld. It included his further remarks: “It must be 
clear that no person can guarantee these areas against military 
attack.” “Should such an attack occur... [init]ial reliance must be 
upon the people attacked to resist it and then upon... the United 
Nations which so far has not proved a weak reed to lean on.”51)
Acheson was clearly committed to maintaining South Korean 
morale and to providing some degree of economic assistance. During 
hearings before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Senator 
50) Cumings, Korean War, 72. For a critique of Cummings’ earlier studies, see 
John Edward Wilz, “The Making of Mr Truman’s War,” in Korean War 
Conference Committee, The Historical Reillumination on the Korean War 
(Seoul: War Memorial Service, 1990), [81-108], 93-94. Wilz finds Cumings’ 
claim wholly unconvincing: had Acheson been baiting the communists to attack, 
then US forces would have been prepared, but these “troops were woefully 
unprepared.”
51) Walter Waggoner, “Four Areas Listed. ‘Attaching’ Manchuria, Inner, Outer 
Mongolia, Sinkiang Cited,” New York Times, January 13, 1950.
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Knowland asked what would be the U.S. response to a 
Soviet-inspired attack on the South Korea. Acheson replied, “I do not 
believe we would undertake to resist it by military force.” Vandenberg 
asked, “Independently?” and Acheson answered, “Independently. Of 
course, if under the [UN] Charter action were taken, we would take 
our part in that, but probably it would not be taken because they 
would veto it.”52) This was consistent with the American position for 
at least a year, but appeared a weak answer to the committee. It was 
no surprise, then that on January 19 the bill faced defeat. The 
President and Secretary expressed their “concern and dismay.” They 
did manage, however, to persuade Congress to accept the attachment 
of a Korean appropriation (reduced to $120m) to an extension of the 
China Aid Act, which would offer aid to Taiwan where Chiang’s 
Nationalist forces had gone after their defeat on the mainland. It 
became law on February 14, 1950. On June 5 they secured a second 
year’s appropriation of $100m.53)
Despite these successful efforts in obtaining funds for Korea, it is 
evident that Acheson’s commitment was less substantial in 1949-1950 
than it had been in 1946-1947. In testimony to the House Committee 
on Foreign Affairs in June 1949, he argued that without the aid he 
sought “Korea will collapse and Korea will fall into the communist 
52) Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Historical Series, Reviews of the World 
Situation, 1949-1950 (New York: Garland Publishing, 1979), 191.
53) On these developments, see Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Historical 
Series, Economic Assistance to China and Korea, 1949-1950 (New York: 
Garland Publishing, 1979). House Committee on Foreign Affairs, United States 
Policy in the Far East Part 2: Korea Assistance Acts (Washington DC: USGPO, 
1976), 406-407; cited by Dobbs, The Unwanted Symbol, 216n42. Acheson, 
Present at the Creation, 358. McGlothlen, Controlling the Waves, 74-75.
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area. If you do this, there is a chance it will not.” He added that “if 
the Soviet Union really puts its weight behind it... they would take 
the country over. There is nothing we can do about it.”54) His 
remarks to the Foreign Relations Committee in January 1950 repeated 
this diagnosis. Even as late as May 1950 he spoke about America’s 
attachment to South Korea but omitted any commitment of military 
assistance if it was attacked.55) Many years later, he said that he had 
shared the belief that Korea would slip behind the iron curtain as a 
result of guerrilla warfare, psychological warfare, or a combination of 
both, and there did not seem much to be done to stop this.56) Robert 
Ferrell suggests three ingredients in the Truman administration’s 
avoidance of a commitment to Korea: the experience of a costly 
failure in China; the US Army’s argument that it needed all its 
troops for Western Europe and other bases around the world, and for 
its reserve in the United States; and a fear that backing South Korea 
might draw the administration into another debacle over Taiwan (help 
for Korea was likely to bring calls for support of the Chinese 
Nationalists in Taiwan from the Republican supporters).57)
From all this it seems quite clear that there was no American 
military commitment to South Korea. It is understandable, however, 
why Cumings might think that Acheson was readier in private to 
support deploying armed forces in defense of Korea, for spring 1950 
54) US Congress, House of Representatives, House Committee on Foreign Affairs, 
Hearings on H.R. 5330, 81st Congress, 1st Session, 1949, p.192; cited in Dobbs, 
The Unwanted Symbol, 164.
55) FRUS 1950 Ⅶ, 67n, Acheson press conference, May 3, 1950.
56) Ferrell, Truman, 319.
57) Ibid., 318-319.
 Dean Acheson and the Place of Korea   113
saw him espouse a tougher general strategy. In a press conference on 
February 8 and then in a speech on February 16 Acheson spoke of 
the need of a firm, thorough, and coordinated response to Soviet 
communism. The United States should develop “situations of 
strength” around the world and should involve all the agencies of 
government in a campaign of “total diplomacy.”58) Acheson argued 
that these “situations of strength” required much greater military 
strength. This led to the creation of a new policy document in April 
1950-NSC 68. It described the Soviet Union as inherently 
expansionist and urged American resistance to communism 
everywhere. It recommended large-scale rearmament by the United 
States and its allies to meet the threat. Yet, it would be a mistake to 
extrapolate from this a readiness by the administration to send troops 
in defense of South Korea. While Truman backed Acheson’s call for 
a resolute approach to the Soviets, he resisted a massive increase in 
defence expenditure.59) Moreover, the President shared Acheson’s 
view of the need to be circumspect in Asia. On January 5 he told a 
press conference that there would be no American military aid or 
advice for Taiwan.60) On the eve of the North Korean attack 
Acheson and Truman were trying to perform what proved to be an 
unsuccessful balancing act between support for the government in 
58) Acheson remarks at February 8, 1950, press conference, Department of State 
Bulletin 22.555 (February 20, 1950): 272-274; Dean Acheson, “‘Total 
Diplomacy’ to Strengthen U.S. Leadership for Human Freedom,” Department of 
State Bulletin 22.559 (March 20, 1950): 427-429; Acheson, Present at the 
Creation, 378-379.
59) FRUS 1950 I 234-292, NSC 68, April 7, 1950.
60) Harry S. Truman, Press Conference, January 5, 1950, accessed October 29, 2012 
November 26, 2012, www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=13678&st=&st1=.
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Seoul and avoiding unrealistic commitments in Asia.
Conclusion
Korea assumed a low significance for most American policymakers 
before 1950, especially among the military. In the immediate 
aftermath of the Second World War Dean Acheson shared that 
perspective. But in the course of 1946 he developed an appreciation 
of the importance of the peninsula. While in office in 1946-1947 he 
urged the need to demonstrate American commitment to a democratic 
and independent Korea. But, above all, he pressed the economic case 
for assisting Korea, principally for its economic value to Japan. 
Contrary to the claims of Offner, he did not rush to make it a Cold 
War battleground. He advocated cooperation with the Soviet Union, 
which he continued to favor as late as spring 1947. Despite his best 
efforts, he failed to secure economic assistance from Congress. With 
his departure as Under Secretary in June 1947 the legislation was 
abandoned.
In his absence, Korea assumed much less importance for the 
administration; the military view of its strategic insignificance 
prevailed. However, when Acheson returned to office as Secretary of 
State in January 1949 he revived schemes for aid but had to concede 
that the peninsula was not a crucial strategic interest. His speech in 
January 1950 and his testimony to the House Foreign Affairs 
Committee in June 1949 and to the Senate Foreign Relations 
Committee in January 1950 demonstrate Acheson’s desire to aid 
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Korea but also his reticence about what the United States could 
realistically promise. Cumings’ claim that Acheson lured the North 
into an attack lacks supporting evidence, but there can be little doubt 
that he had made a strategic miscalculation. There was a strong 
element of wishful thinking and a desire to avoid another disastrous 
intervention in Asia. But it was not bungled diplomacy. Acheson’s 
reaction to the attack of June 25 was tough and decisive but he was 
not completely at odds with the views he expressed since he became 
Secretary of State. He encouraged the President to make a firm 
response and aimed to channel American action through the United 
Nations; and he was more restrained than Defense Secretary Louis 
Johnson. American involvement increased in stages. But the blatant 
nature of the assault made it impossible for the President and 
Secretary, given their strong advocacy of resistance to communist 
threats, to do anything but intervene.
The eventually massive US military commitment was rooted more 
in the desire to deter aggression and to resist communist expansion 
than the wish to protect a strategically important territory. President 
and Secretary adopted the limited goal of restoring the pre-war 
borders. For a time, however, military victories seduced them into 
broadening their goals and believing they could unite the peninsula. 
But they opposed MacArthur’s attempts to expand the war and 
restated their limited war strategy when the Chinese intervened; the 
risks of hostilities with China and its ally the Soviet Union were too 
great. Truman and Acheson might have spoken of Soviet-inspired 
aggression, but they were determined to localise the conflict. Acheson 
was the leading exponent of engagement with Korea in the Truman 
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administration, but his commitment was always qualified, even in 
wartime.
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Abstract
Dean Acheson and the Place of Korea in American 
Foreign and Security Policy, 1945-1950
Michael F. Hopkins
(University of Liverpool)
The Korean War was a vital part of the career of Dean Acheson and has 
justly attracted a considerable number of studies. His involvement in policy 
to the peninsula before 1950, however, has seen little detailed analysis. This 
article explores Acheson’s view of Korea and his influence on policy to the 
country during his time as Under Secretary of State between August 1945 
and June 1947, and as Secretary of State from January 1949.
It concludes that Acheson was committed to Korean independence and the 
development of its political institutions and to its economic rehabilitation. 
The country was an important component of his Asian policy. But the 
territory itself, even during the War, was never a strategic priority. Before 
June 1950 Acheson advocated aid, but this was limited by Congressional 
restrictions on funding. The massive US military commitment in response to 
the attack was designed more to deter aggression and to resist communist 
expansion than to protect a strategically important territory. For most of the 
conflict the Americans and Acheson favored a limited war. Acheson’s 
outlook was realistic in terms of the geopolitical situation and domestic 
constraints.
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